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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
M.R. and J.R., the parents of E.R., a minor, appeal 
from an order of the District Court, granting judgment on the 
administrative record in favor of Ridley School District.  The 
District Court reversed a decision by a Pennsylvania Due 
Process Hearing Officer that Ridley School District violated 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 
U.S.C. 1400, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 701, et seq.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm 
the order of the District Court. 
I.  Background 
E.R., who is now ten years old, attended kindergarten 
(2006-2007) and first grade (2007-2008) at Grace Park 
Elementary School (“Grace Park”) in the Ridley School 
District (“Ridley”).  E.R. has been identified as a child with 
numerous learning disabilities, as well as several health-
related problems, including severe food and contact allergies.  
During the summer between E.R.’s first and second grade 
years, M.R. and J.R. (collectively, “Parents”) determined that 
the programs being offered by Ridley were inadequate to 
address E.R.’s unique needs, and thus decided to remove her 
from Ridley and enroll her at the Benchmark School, a 
private school that specializes in instructing students with 
learning disabilities.  Parents subsequently filed a complaint 
with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, seeking 
compensatory education for violations of the IDEA and § 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act, and tuition reimbursement, 
including transportation expenses, for E.R.’s enrollment in 
the Benchmark School.  A Due Process Hearing Officer 
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awarded Parents compensatory education for the 2007-2008 
school year, as well as reimbursement of tuition for the 2008-
2009 school year, and reimbursement for transportation to 
and from the Benchmark School.  The District Court 
reversed, finding that Parents were entitled to neither 
compensatory education nor reimbursement for tuition or 
transportation expenses. 
 A. Factual Background 
 Before E.R. began kindergarten, Parents were 
concerned about her ability to grasp pre-academic skills, such 
as letters and numbers, and took her to be evaluated at the 
Chester County Intermediate Unit (“CCIU”).  Although the 
testing noted some academic difficulties, the evaluators 
concluded that E.R. did not qualify as a child with special 
needs.  However, in September 2006, shortly after E.R. began 
kindergarten, she was identified as needing extra academic 
support, and was placed in extended-day kindergarten 
(“EDK”).  Parents were notified of this placement, and were 
advised that it was intended to improve E.R.’s math skills and 
reinforce her kindergarten skills generally. 
 In November 2006, due to E.R.’s academic struggles 
and attention problems, Parents requested that Ridley perform 
an educational evaluation.  Ridley agreed, and an Initial 
Evaluation Report was completed on January 31, 2007.  
Although the report indicated that math was difficult for E.R., 
consistent with CCIU’s earlier determination, Ridley 
concluded that she did not qualify for special education 
services because her cognitive ability and academic 
achievement levels were both in the average range.  Ridley 
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also conducted an occupational therapy (“OT”) evaluation, 
which was completed on January 24, 2007.  The OT findings, 
which were based largely on the input of teachers, identified 
the following areas of concern: below grade level ability in 
math; lack of concentration; inconsistency in remembering 
numbers one through ten; problems with peer interaction; 
poor problem-solving skills and desk posture; and difficulty 
keeping her place when reading. 
 On February 7, 2007, Ridley convened a meeting to 
review the Initial Evaluation Report.  In response to concerns 
raised by Parents at the meeting, Ridley agreed to conduct 
additional testing using The Children’s Memory Scale, Test 
of Auditory Processing Skills, and The Behavior Rating 
Inventory of Executive Functioning.  The additional testing 
resulted in two addendums to the Initial Evaluation Report, 
which stated that E.R.’s academic skills were generally in the 
average range, but that she demonstrated a relative weakness 
in retaining and manipulating numbers.  Based on this 
information, the school psychologist concluded that E.R. did 
not have a specific learning disability.  Also in February 
2007, a § 504 Service Agreement (“the § 504 Agreement”) 
was issued to provide OT services to E.R., and to address her 
severe allergies.1
                                              
1 “§ 504” refers to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
which prohibits discrimination in federally-funded programs, 
including public schools, on the basis of disability.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 794. 
  Under the § 504 Agreement, E.R. was to 
receive OT services once a week for thirty minutes and 
consultative services to the home and classroom on a regular 
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basis.  Despite her allergies, E.R. was to be included in as 
many activities as possible, and Parents were to be contacted 
before activities involving food so that appropriate 
alternatives could be provided for E.R. 
 Pursuant to a recommendation made by E.R.’s 
kindergarten teacher, Mary Moffatt (“Moffatt”), E.R. was 
enrolled in the Summer Steps program in the Summer of 
2007 to reinforce her academic skills.  The Summer Steps 
teacher reported that E.R. made some academic progress, but 
that she needed improvement in several areas and had 
difficulty recognizing numbers and counting. 
 The first six weeks of first grade were spent reviewing 
kindergarten materials.  During this time, E.R. struggled 
academically and posted several failing grades.  In late 
September 2007, J.R., E.R.’s mother, wrote to E.R.’s first 
grade teacher, Janet Cenname (“Cenname”), and requested a 
meeting to discuss E.R.’s poor grades.  Cenname declined the 
request to meet at that time, telling J.R. that it would be 
premature to meet so early in the year, and that it would be 
more appropriate to give E.R. time to develop her skills.  
Cenname explained that she would be “happy to meet” a few 
weeks later, in early October, if Parents still had concerns.  
Parents did not re-contact Cenname, and instead requested a 
meeting with the school’s principal.  During that meeting, 
which was held on November 1, 2007, Parents were informed 
that E.R. had been placed on a “reading watch list” in mid-
October.  Following the meeting, E.R. was placed in a 
reading support group, but according to Parents, she had 
difficulty catching up with the other students because the 
program had started two months earlier. 
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 On November 16, 2007, Parents requested a 
comprehensive reevaluation of E.R.  Ridley issued a 
Permission to Evaluate on November 27, 2007, and the 
reevaluation was completed on February 26, 2008.  The 
Reevaluation Report found that E.R. had learning disabilities 
in the areas of reading decoding and comprehension, math 
computation, reasoning skills, and written language.  E.R. 
was also found to have fine motor delays and a language 
disability.  As part of the Reevaluation Report, Ridley’s 
school psychologist prepared recommendations to be 
considered by the Individual Education Planning Team (“IEP 
Team”).  Based on those recommendations, Ridley offered 
two alternative placements for E.R.:  (1) the learning support 
room at her current school, Grace Park, or (2) a self-contained 
classroom at a different elementary school.  Parents observed 
both programs and determined that neither was appropriate 
for E.R. 
 An IEP Team meeting was convened on March 28, 
2008 to review a draft Individualized Education Program 
(“IEP”) that had been developed to address E.R.’s educational 
needs.  At Parents’ request, Ridley agreed to make revisions 
to the IEP and submit the revisions to Parents for approval.  
At the meeting, Ridley’s Special Education Director, Kim 
Woods (“Woods”), suggested a program called Project Read 
as a possible reading aid for E.R.  Woods told Parents that she 
would do some research on the program and follow up with 
Parents and the IEP Team in a few days.  Woods also 
provided Parents with a printout from Project Read’s website, 
and a review of the program conducted by the Florida Center 
for Reading Research. 
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 A Notice of Recommended Educational Placement 
(“NOREP”) was issued on April 2, 2008, but Parents refused 
to sign it until all of the agreed-upon revisions had been 
made.  Another IEP Team meeting was held on April 30 to 
address Parents’ continuing concerns regarding the IEP.  On 
May 9, a revised NOREP was issued, and Parents signed it in 
agreement on May 12.  However, Parents remained 
concerned about Ridley’s proposed reading program, and 
requested that Ridley hire someone to provide instruction 
using The Wilson Reading System.  Ridley did not do so. 
 On May 13, 2008, in accordance with the revised 
NOREP and addendums to the IEP, E.R. began going to 
Grace Park’s “resource room” every day for one hour of 
reading assistance in the morning and one hour of math 
assistance in the afternoon.  The resource room reading 
curriculum consisted of the following instructional programs:  
Read Naturally, Reading Workshop, Writing Workshop, and 
Patricia Cunningham’s Systematic Phonics.  The resource 
room employed a program called Everyday Math for math 
instruction.  There were five other students in the resource 
room, none of whom were first graders.  Aimee Hodges 
(“Hodges”), the resource room teacher, explained that 
although the students were all provided with the same reading 
programs, different parts of the programs were used for 
different students, such that assistance was geared toward 
each student’s individual needs.  Hodges also testified that 
everything done in the resource room was “multi-sensory,” 
which meant that the lessons included visual, oral, and hands-
on components.  E.R.’s grades in the resource room improved 
dramatically in a short period of time, but Parents attributed 
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the improvement to improper resource room assistance, and 
claimed that E.R. was not displaying similar progress at 
home.  By the time E.R.’s first grade year ended, she had 
received eighteen days of resource room assistance. 
 On June 9, 2008, the IEP Team met to update the IEP 
for the 2008-2009 academic year (second grade).  The 
NOREP from the June IEP Team meeting recommended that 
E.R. continue to receive one hour per day of math instruction 
and one hour per day of reading instruction in the resource 
room.  The NOREP indicated that the reading instruction 
would include a direct reading program, as well as a direct 
phonemic-based program to address E.R.’s needs in decoding 
vocabulary, fluency, and comprehension skills.  The NOREP 
provided that Ridley would train its learning support staff on 
Project Read during the summer, and that the program would 
be “up and running” before the end of September 2008.  
Ridley also agreed to pay for a summer learning program at 
the Benchmark School, as well as summer math tutoring three 
times per week. 
 Parents researched Project Read and determined that it 
was not appropriate for a student with E.R.’s needs.  On 
August 14, 2008, Parents informed Ridley that E.R. would be 
enrolling at the Benchmark School for the 2008-2009 school 
year because it provided the “intensive multi-sensory 
approach to reading” that they determined E.R. required. 
 B. Procedural History 
 On December 4, 2008, Parents filed a due process 
complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, 
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alleging that Ridley violated the IDEA and § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.  Parents claimed that Ridley failed to 
timely identify E.R. as a child in need of special education 
services, failed to develop an appropriate IEP, and subjected 
E.R. to discrimination by failing to comply with the § 504 
Agreement. 
Hearings were held before a Due Process Hearing 
Officer on January 29, 2009, February 10, 2009, and 
March 10, 2009.  At the hearings, the Hearing Officer 
reviewed documentary evidence provided by the parties and 
heard testimony from E.R.’s mother, Linda Heller, Parents’ 
special education advocate, as well as several teachers and 
school officials.  On April 21, 2009, the Hearing Officer 
issued a written report, finding that:  (1) Ridley had not 
committed any violations during E.R.’s kindergarten year; 
(2) Ridley violated the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act in 
E.R.’s first grade year; and (3) the IEPs proposed for E.R.’s 
first and second grade years were inadequate and therefore 
denied E.R. a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) 
because they “lacked appropriate specially designed 
instruction in the form of a research based, peer reviewed 
reading program.”  The Hearing Officer awarded Parents 
compensatory education for the 2007-2008 year (first grade), 
reimbursement of tuition at the Benchmark School for the 
2008-2009 year (second grade), and reimbursement of 
transportation expenses to and from the Benchmark School. 
Ridley filed a petition for review in the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court, and the case was subsequently 
removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Parents treated the petition as a complaint and 
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filed an answer and counterclaims, in which they challenged 
the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that no violation occurred 
during E.R.’s kindergarten year, and asserted additional 
claims against Ridley and Cenname, whom Parents added as 
a third party defendant.  On October 9, 2009, Ridley filed a 
motion for judgment on the administrative record.  On 
February 14, 2011, the District Court affirmed the Hearing 
Officer’s finding as to E.R.’s kindergarten year, reversed the 
Hearing Officer’s findings as to E.R.’s first and second grade 
years, and granted Ridley’s motion for judgment on the 
administrative record as to all claims.  Ridley Sch. Dist. v. 
M.R., No. 09-2503, 2011 WL 499966, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
14, 2011).  Parents filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 On appeal, Parents raise four arguments.  First, they 
contend that the District Court improperly placed the burden 
of persuasion on them to demonstrate that Ridley violated the 
IDEA.  Second, they argue that the District Court erred in 
reversing the Hearing Officer’s finding that Ridley denied 
E.R. a FAPE during first grade by failing to timely identify 
her as a student in need of special education services.  Third, 
they maintain that the District Court misinterpreted a 
provision of the IDEA, and improperly reversed the Hearing 
Officer’s finding that E.R.’s IEP was deficient in that it 
lacked research-based, peer-reviewed specially designed 
reading instruction.  Finally, Parents argue that the District 
Court erred in concluding that Ridley did not violate § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act. 
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II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the 
decision of the state educational agency under 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2), and we have appellate jurisdiction over the order 
of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When 
considering a petition for review challenging a state 
administrative decision under the IDEA, a district court 
applies “a nontraditional standard of review, sometimes 
referred to as ‘modified de novo’ review.”  D.S. v. Bayonne 
Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations 
omitted).  Under this standard, a district court must give “due 
weight” to the findings of the state hearing officer.  Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).  “Factual findings 
from the administrative proceedings are to be considered 
prima facie correct.  ‘If a reviewing court fails to adhere to 
them, it is obliged to explain why.  The court is not, however, 
to substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for 
those of local school authorities.’”  S.H. v. State-Operated 
Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting MM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 
531 (4th Cir. 2002)).  “Within the confines of these standards, 
a district court is authorized to make findings based on the 
preponderance of the evidence and grant the relief it deems 
appropriate.”  D.S., 602 F.3d at 564 (citations omitted); see 
also Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 
199 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing a district court’s burden as 
“unusual” in that it must make its own findings by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but nevertheless afford “due 
weight” to the administrative officer’s determinations). 
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 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
conclusions of law, D.S., 602 F.3d at 564, and “with respect 
to the question [of] whether the District Court applied the 
correct legal standards under the IDEA,” Shore Reg’l, 381 
F.3d at 199 (citation omitted).  We review the District Court’s 
findings of fact, including a determination as to the 
appropriateness of an IEP, under a clearly erroneous standard.  
D.S., 602 F.3d at 564. 
III. Discussion 
 A. Statutory Framework 
The IDEA requires states receiving federal education 
funding to provide every disabled child with a “free 
appropriate public education.”  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).2
                                              
2 “The term ‘free appropriate public education’ means 
special education and related services that-- 
  A 
 
(A) have been provided at public expense, 
under public supervision and direction, and without 
charge; 
 
(B) meet the standards of the State educational 
agency; 
 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, 
elementary school, or secondary school education in 
the State involved; and 
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FAPE “consists of educational instruction specially designed 
to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported 
by such services as are necessary to permit the child ‘to 
benefit’ from the instruction.”  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89.  
Although a state is not required to maximize the potential of 
every handicapped child, it must supply an education that 
provides “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit” to 
the child.  D.S., 602 F.3d at 556 (citing Ridgewood Bd. of 
Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999)).  “[T]he 
provision of merely more than a trivial educational benefit” is 
insufficient.  L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 
(3d Cir. 2006) (internal marks and citations omitted).  When a 
state is unable to provide a FAPE, the state must reimburse 
the child’s parents for the costs of attendance at a private 
school that is able to provide a FAPE.  D.S., 602 F.3d at 557. 
The core of the IDEA is the collaborative process that 
it establishes between parents and schools.  Schaffer v. Weast, 
546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005).  The IEP is the “central vehicle” for 
this collaboration, id., and the “primary mechanism” for 
delivering a FAPE, W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 
1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City 
Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  Under the 
IDEA, school districts must work with parents to design an 
IEP, which is a program of individualized instruction for each 
                                                                                                     
(D) are provided in conformity with the 
individualized education program required under [20 
U.S.C. § 1414(d)].” 
 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 
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special education student.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d).  
“Each IEP must include an assessment of the child’s current 
educational performance, must articulate measurable 
educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special 
services that the school will provide.”  Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 
53 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)).  Although the IEP 
must provide the student with a “basic floor of opportunity,” 
it does not have to provide “the optimal level of services,” or 
incorporate every program requested by the child’s parents.  
D.S., 602 F.3d at 557 (citations omitted); Tucker v. Bay Shore 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that the IDEA guarantees to a disabled child “an 
education that is appropriate, not one that provides everything 
that might be thought desirable by loving parents” (internal 
marks and citations omitted)).  “[A]t a minimum, the IEP 
must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s 
intellectual potential,” Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of 
Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), 
and “individual abilities,” Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d 
at 248.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 991 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (stating that an IEP must “be likely to produce 
progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement”) 
(citation omitted). 
If parents believe that an IEP fails to provide their 
child with a FAPE, they may seek an administrative 
“impartial due process hearing.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).  A 
school district may also request such a hearing, if, for 
example, it wants to change an existing IEP and the parents 
refuse, or if the parents refuse to allow their child to be 
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evaluated at all.  Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53.  Although state 
authorities have limited discretion in determining who 
conducts the hearings and establishing hearing procedures, 
Congress has legislated the “central components” of the 
administrative hearings by providing minimal pleading 
standards, and affording all parties the right to counsel, the 
right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine 
witnesses.  Id. at 54.  “Any party aggrieved by the findings 
and decision” made in the administrative proceeding “shall 
have the right to bring a civil action” in state or federal court.  
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
A threshold issue we are asked to consider in this case 
is which party bears the burden of persuasion before the 
district court.  The IDEA does not specify which party bears 
the burden of persuasion at the district court level or at the 
administrative hearing level.  Before 2005, we had always 
placed the burden of demonstrating compliance with the 
IDEA at the administrative hearing on the school district.  
L.E., 435 F.3d at 391 (citing T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of 
Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2000); Oberti v. Bd. of 
Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993)).  However, in 
2005, in Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. at 62, the Supreme Court 
held that the burden of persuasion in an administrative 
hearing under the IDEA lies with the party seeking relief.  
The Court explained that it saw no reason to depart from “the 
ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to 
prove their claims.”  Id. at 56 (citing 2 J. Strong, McCormick 
on Evidence § 337, at 412 (5th ed. 1999)); see L.E., 435 F.3d 
at 391 (discussing the significance of Schaffer). 
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However, Schaffer did not address which party should 
bear the burden of persuasion when a party aggrieved by the 
decision of the administrative hearing officer challenges that 
decision in district court.  Nor have we explicitly decided this 
issue in articulating the district court’s standard of review.  
We now join our sister circuits in holding that the party 
challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of 
persuasion before the district court as to each claim 
challenged.3
                                              
3 Our conclusion today that the burden lies with the 
party challenging the administrative decision is entirely 
consistent with our previous cases, in which we held that the 
burden was properly placed on the parents before the district 
court.  In those cases, the parents were the losing party before 
the hearing officer and challenged the hearing officer’s 
decision in district court.  See Andrew M. v. Del. Cnty. Office 
of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 345 
(3d Cir. 2007); L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 
392 (3d Cir. 2006).  We did not specify, however, whether the 
parents bore the burden because they initially challenged the 
IEP (and the burden carried to the district court) or because 
they lost at the administrative hearing level.  As our decision 
today makes clear, the relevant consideration is the outcome 
of the administrative proceeding, not which party requests an 
administrative hearing. 
  See J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 
431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010); Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. 
C.D., 616 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2010); District of Columbia 
v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  As the Supreme 
Court noted in Schaffer, “[t]he burdens of pleading and proof 
with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to 
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the [party] who . . . seeks to change the present state of 
affairs.”  546 U.S. at 56 (quoting McCormick on Evidence 
§ 337, at 412).  Under the IDEA, it is the party “aggrieved by 
the findings and decision” of the hearing officer that seeks to 
change the present state of affairs.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).  “Absent some reason to believe that 
Congress intended otherwise,” we conclude that the burden of 
persuasion falls where it usually does, on the party seeking 
relief.  See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57-58; see also S.H., 336 
F.3d at 270 (explaining that factual findings from the 
administrative proceeding are to be considered prima facie 
correct). 
In this case, Parents argue that the District Court 
committed reversible error by placing the burden of 
persuasion on them as to all claims.  We disagree.  Although 
the District Court did, in fact, err by placing the burden on 
Parents with respect to the findings of the Hearing Officer 
that were challenged by Ridley, the error was harmless.4
                                              
4 We note that Parents filed counterclaims, in which 
they challenged the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that Ridley 
did not violate the IDEA or the Rehabilitation Act during 
E.R.’s kindergarten year.  Parents appropriately bore the 
burden of persuasion as to those claims because they were the 
party aggrieved by the Hearing Officer’s decision. 
  We 
will deem an error to be harmless if it is “highly probable” 
that it did not affect the outcome of the case.  Forrest v. Beloit 
Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  In 
a non-criminal case, an error regarding the placement of the 
burden of persuasion will frequently be harmless.  Schaffer, 
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546 U.S. at 56, 58.  As the Supreme Court has explained, in a 
non-criminal case, the burden of persuasion only comes into 
play where the evidence is “closely balanced,” id. at 56, i.e., 
in cases “in evidentiary equipoise,” id. at 58.  In this case, as 
we explain below, no factual issues are so “closely balanced” 
that the burden of persuasion would have affected the 
outcome of the case.  See id. at 56.  Although some of the 
disputed issues involve questions of fact, the Hearing 
Officer’s errors stemmed largely from mistakes or omissions 
regarding the application of law to those facts.  Questions of 
law, of course, are unaffected by the burden of persuasion.  El 
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 
2007) (stating that the burden of persuasion is the burden “to 
persuade the factfinder that one’s propositions of fact are 
indeed true” (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 190 (7th ed. 
1999))).  Thus, we hold that it is “highly probable” that the 
District Court’s error regarding the placement of the burden 
of persuasion did not affect the outcome.  Forrest, 424 F.3d at 
349. 
 B. “Child Find” Requirement 
Parents contend that the District Court erred in 
reversing the Hearing Officer’s determination that Ridley’s 
failure to identify E.R. as a child in need of special education 
services in the beginning of first grade denied her a FAPE.  
We disagree.  “School districts have a continuing obligation 
under the IDEA . . . to identify and evaluate all students who 
are reasonably suspected of having a disability.”  P.P. v. West 
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted); see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (explaining that 
states must “identif[y], locate[], and evaluate[]” all children 
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with disabilities who are in need of special education, and 
must develop “a practical method . . . to determine which 
children with disabilities are currently receiving needed 
special education and related services”).  This is referred to as 
the IDEA’s “child find” requirement.  Matula, 67 F.3d at 492.  
Each state must establish procedures to fulfill this statutory 
directive.  34 C.F.R. § 300.111.  Pennsylvania’s “child find” 
procedures are set forth in 22 Pa. Code. §§ 14.121 through 
14.125. 
Neither the IDEA, its implementing regulations, nor 
the applicable Pennsylvania regulations establish a deadline 
by which children who are suspected of having a qualifying 
disability must be identified and evaluated.  Accordingly, we 
have previously “infer[red] a requirement that this be done 
within a reasonable time after school officials are on notice of 
behavior that is likely to indicate a disability.”  Matula, 67 
F.3d at 501.5
                                              
5 In W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995), we 
were dealing with a challenge to a school district’s 
compliance with child find obligations under the IDEA and 
New Jersey law.  However, because nothing in the 
Pennsylvania regulations establishes a specified timeline for 
identifying and evaluating students, we will apply the 
“reasonable time” standard to school districts in Pennsylvania 
as well.  See id. at 501 (inferring the “reasonable time” 
requirement because neither the IDEA nor the applicable 
New Jersey regulations established such a deadline). 
  In adopting the “reasonable time” standard, we 
noted the budgetary constraints and staffing pressures facing 
school officials, and emphasized that we were not 
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establishing any “bright-line rule” as to what constitutes a 
reasonable time.  Id.  Rather, we employ a case-by-case 
approach and assess whether the school district’s response 
was reasonable “in light of the information and resources 
possessed” by the district at a given point in time.  Id. 
Here, in finding that Ridley denied E.R. a FAPE by 
failing to identify her as a student in need of special education 
services at the outset of first grade, the Hearing Officer never 
acknowledged that Ridley must be given a reasonable time to 
identify students as disabled.  Rather, the Hearing Officer 
simply stated that Ridley had provided a number of 
intervention programs to E.R. during kindergarten, and 
because E.R. continued to struggle academically in first 
grade, Ridley should have known that further evaluation was 
required at the very start of the next school year.  The Hearing 
Officer was particularly critical of E.R.’s first grade teacher, 
Janet Cenname, explaining that Cenname was “extremely 
nervous and uptight” when testifying, she had to refer to 
notes, and she frequently tried to explain her actions in a 
“non-sensical way.”  The Hearing Officer concluded that, 
based on E.R.’s struggles during the first month of first grade, 
much of which was spent reviewing kindergarten materials, 
Cenname should have identified E.R. as a student in need of 
special education services at the very beginning of the year, 
and thus should have recommended to Ridley that it conduct 
another evaluation.  Accordingly, the Hearing Officer 
determined that Ridley denied E.R. a FAPE “from the 
beginning of first grade to the time that the evaluation was 
completed” in February 2008. 
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As the District Court observed, the Hearing Officer’s 
finding that Ridley violated the IDEA by failing to identify 
E.R. as a child in need of special education services at the 
outset of first grade is difficult to reconcile with the Hearing 
Officer’s finding that Ridley complied with the IDEA during 
E.R.’s kindergarten year.  E.R. was evaluated during 
kindergarten, and although areas of weakness were found, 
E.R.’s academic skills were generally considered to be in the 
average range.  The Hearing Officer concluded that the 
kindergarten evaluation was “substantively appropriate,” and 
noted that “just because a child has an area of weakness, it 
doesn’t necessarily mean that [she has] a disability.”  The 
Hearing Officer also noted that Ridley “appeared to be 
invested in addressing [E.R.’s] needs and providing 
appropriate instruction and interventions before rushing to 
special education identification.”  As a result, the Hearing 
Officer properly determined that Parents’ claim that Ridley 
violated the IDEA’s “child find” requirements during E.R.’s 
kindergarten year “lack[ed] any basis in the testimony or 
documents.”6
In light of the fact that E.R.’s kindergarten evaluations 
were appropriate, and she did not qualify as a student in need 
of special education services in June 2007 (the end of 
kindergarten), we cannot agree with the Hearing Officer that 
Ridley violated the IDEA and denied E.R. a FAPE by failing 
to immediately reevaluate her in September 2007.  When a 
 
                                              
6 Parents do not appeal the District Court’s decision 
affirming the Hearing Officer’s finding regarding E.R.’s 
kindergarten year. 
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school district has conducted a comprehensive evaluation and 
concluded that a student does not qualify as disabled under 
the IDEA, the school district must be afforded a reasonable 
time to monitor the student’s progress before exploring 
whether further evaluation is required.  See Matula, 67 F.3d at 
501.  We assess whether a school district identified and 
evaluated a student suspected of having a qualifying disability 
within a reasonable time “in light of the information and 
resources possessed” by the district.  Id.  Here, although E.R. 
struggled during the beginning of first grade, all prior 
evaluations showed that she did not require special education 
services.  Moreover, as Cenname testified, first grade was the 
“first time that the children ever ha[d] a chance to be in a test 
taking situation” and “[t]here were other children that also 
had difficulty . . . taking a test.”  It was reasonable for 
Cenname to assess E.R.’s progress throughout the first 
marking period of first grade before recommending that E.R. 
again be evaluated to determine if she had a learning 
disability.  The IDEA does not require a reevaluation every 
time a student posts a poor grade.  Accordingly, we hold that 
Ridley complied with its “child find” obligations, and E.R. 
was not denied a FAPE at the beginning of first grade.7
                                              
7 Parents contend that the District Court did not accord 
the proper deference to the Hearing Officer’s factual findings, 
particularly her finding that Cenname was not a credible 
witness.  Where a hearing officer “has heard live testimony 
and determined that one witness is more credible than another 
witness, [the hearing officer’s] determination is due special 
weight.”  D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d 
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Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  A district court must accept the 
hearing officer’s credibility determinations “unless the non-
testimonial extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a 
contrary conclusion.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Here, central to 
the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that E.R. was denied a 
FAPE during the beginning of first grade was that Cenname 
“put off” meeting with E.R.’s mother when E.R.’s mother 
expressed concern that her daughter had failed a math test.  
However, Cenname responded to E.R.’s mother’s request for 
a meeting by sending back the following note:  
 
 Dear Mrs. [R], 
 
I appreciate your concern about [E.R.’s] test, 
but it is very early in the year.  We need to give her 
some time.  Continue to work with her at home and 
reinforce what we are doing in class.  I will probably 
be out from Oct. 2 – Oct. 15.  If you still have 
concerns at that time, I will be happy to meet. 
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 C. E.R.’s IEP 
 Parents next contend that the District Court erred in 
reversing the Hearing Officer’s finding that E.R.’s IEP was 
inadequate.  For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.  
First, to the extent Ridley violated the IDEA’s procedural 
requirements by failing to include the requisite statement of 
specially designed instruction in the IEP, the violation was 
not actionable because it did not have any impact on the 
substantive rights of E.R. or Parents.  Second, contrary to the 
Hearing Officer’s findings, E.R.’s educational plan included a 
peer-reviewed reading program, which, in conjunction with 
the other services that E.R. was scheduled to receive, was 
sufficient to provide a FAPE.  We will discuss these points in 
turn. 
1. 
 An IEP must consist of a detailed written statement 
arrived at by a multi-disciplinary team specifying the 
                                                                                                     
Thus, contrary to Parents’ suggestions, Cenname did 
not refuse to meet or indicate that a meeting was unnecessary.  
She expressed a clear willingness to meet, and simply told 
Parents that E.R. should be given some time to get her 
bearings.  Parents never responded to this note and never met 
with Cenname to discuss E.R.’s academic struggles.  
Therefore, as the District Court found, non-testimonial 
evidence in the record demonstrates that Cenname’s response 
to Parents’ request for a meeting was entirely reasonable, and 
that it in no way resulted in the denial of a FAPE.  See D.S., 
602 F.3d at 564. 
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services, including specially designed instruction, that the 
child will receive.  Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate 
Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988).  Parents contend 
that they are entitled to compensatory education because the 
IEP developed by Ridley failed to set forth in sufficient detail 
the specially designed instruction that would be provided to 
E.R.  Parents acknowledge that subsequent NOREPs issued 
by Ridley included the required specially designed 
instruction, but they nevertheless argue that the IDEA 
requires that such information be included in the body of the 
initial IEP.8
Parents’ argument presents a challenge to Ridley’s 
compliance with the IDEA’s procedural requirements.  
Although we have held that “[t]he content of an IEP . . . does 
not implicate the IDEA’s procedural requirements for content 
is concerned with the IEP’s substance,” D.S., 602 F.3d at 565, 
Parents’ argument here does not relate to the substance of the 
IEP.  Rather, Parents’ argument is essentially that Ridley 
violated the IDEA by including a description of specially 
designed instruction in the wrong document.  We have made 
clear that although it is important that a school district comply 
with the IDEA’s procedural requirements, compliance is not a 
goal in itself; rather, compliance with such procedural 
requirements is important because of the “requirements’ 
impact on students’ and parents’ substantive rights.”  Id.  
 
                                              
8 Although the District Court did not address this issue, 
Parents raised it in their brief before the District Court, and 
thus preserved it for review.  See Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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Accordingly, “[a] procedural violation is actionable under the 
IDEA only if it results in a loss of educational opportunity for 
the student, seriously deprives parents of their participation 
rights, or causes a deprivation of educational benefits.”  Id. 
(citing Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 
525-26 (2007)) (second citation omitted). 
Here, to the extent that the absence of specially 
designed instruction in the IEP constituted a procedural 
violation, it did not affect the substantive rights of E.R. or 
Parents, and thus does not entitle Parents to an award of 
compensatory education.  See id.  Although Parents correctly 
note that the initial IEP did not specify all of the special 
education services that E.R. would receive, subsequent 
NOREPs contained that information.  A NOREP issued on 
May 9, 2008, provided that the educational placement 
recommended for E.R. was “[r]esource room learning support 
for math and reading in which a direct reading program will 
be done as well as a direct phonemic based program to 
address [E.R.’s] needs in decoding vocabulary, fluency and 
comprehension skills.”  The May NOREP further stated that 
E.R. would receive “at least 60 minutes per day instruction 
for reading and at least 60 minutes per day math at Grace 
Park Elementary School until June 2008.”  The NOREP 
indicated that an IEP Team meeting would be convened in 
June to review E.R.’s progress and discuss the 
implementation of Project Read for the 2008-2009 school 
year.  Parents signed and approved the May NOREP.  On 
June 9, 2008, Ridley issued a second NOREP, which 
explained that Ridley would provide training to its staff on 
Project Read during the summer and the program would be 
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up and running before the end of September 2008.  Until 
Project Read could be implemented, Ridley would continue 
to use the other resource room reading programs.  The June 
NOREP was never signed by Parents due to their objection to 
Project Read. 
 Because detailed specially designed instruction was set 
forth in the NOREPs, it is properly considered part of E.R.’s 
overall educational plan.  Ridley’s admitted “mistake” in 
failing to include such information in the IEP itself did not 
deny E.R. any educational opportunity, nor did it deprive her 
of any educational benefits.  See D.S., 602 F.3d at 565.  
Moreover, Parents were intimately involved in the process of 
crafting E.R.’s IEP and do not contend that they were 
unaware of the services E.R. was scheduled to receive.  Thus, 
they were not denied their participation rights.  See id.  
Accordingly, any deficiency in Ridley’s compliance with the 
procedural requirements of the IDEA is not a basis for 
granting relief to Parents.  Whether the specially designed 
instruction set forth in the IEP and the NOREPs was adequate 
to provide a FAPE is a separate question, which we will 
address next. 
2. 
Parents’ next argument presents an issue of first 
impression in this circuit.  The Hearing Officer found that 
E.R.’s IEP was inadequate, both for the end of the 2007-2008 
school year (first grade), and all of the 2008-2009 school year 
(second grade) primarily because it “fail[ed] to provide a 
scientifically research-based, peer reviewed reading program, 
which [E.R.] needed in order to make meaningful progress.”  
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The Hearing Officer stated that although Project Read, the 
reading program chosen for E.R., “was designed to be 
research based,” there were “flaws in the research supporting 
it.”  These statements were made in conclusory fashion, 
without elaboration, in a footnote of the Hearing Officer’s 20-
page opinion.  They were not well-explained or well-
supported. 
The District Court reversed the Hearing Officer’s 
decision that the IEP was inappropriate, reasoning that the 
lack of a peer-reviewed instructional program was not 
automatically fatal to an IEP, and even if it was, Project Read 
was research-based and peer-reviewed.  On appeal, we need 
not decide whether the lack of a peer-reviewed reading 
program alone may result in the denial of a FAPE because we 
agree with the District Court that Project Read was based on 
peer-reviewed research.  We will, however, consider Parents’ 
contentions that Ridley denied E.R. a FAPE because the 
available research regarding Project Read was flawed and did 
not adequately demonstrate that Project Read would be 
effective for a student with E.R.’s learning disabilities.  As we 
explain below, Parents’ arguments are unavailing; the peer-
reviewed specially designed reading instruction in E.R.’s IEP 
was “reasonably calculated to enable [her] to receive 
meaningful educational benefits in light of [her] intellectual 
potential.”  Chambers, 587 F.3d at 182 (citation omitted).  
Ridley was not required to choose the reading program based 
on the optimal level of peer-reviewed research, or to 
implement the specific program requested by Parents. 
We begin our analysis by reviewing the statutory 
provision at issue.  In 2004, Congress added the following 
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provision to the IDEA:  “[t]he term ‘individualized education 
program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written statement for each child 
with a disability . . . that includes . . . a statement of the 
special education and related services and supplementary aids 
and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent 
practicable, to be provided to the child.”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (emphasis added).  This provision was 
incorporated into the revised IDEA regulations in 2006, 
which state that an IEP “must include . . . [a] statement of the 
special education and related services and supplementary aids 
and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent 
practicable, to be provided to the child.”  34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.320(a)(4).  Congress amended the IDEA in 1997 and 
2004, in part, to respond to concerns that the statute “ha[d] 
been impeded by low expectations, and an insufficient focus 
on applying replicable research on proven methods of 
teaching and learning for children with disabilities.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1400(c)(4).  The IDEA’s statement of congressional 
findings explains that “[a]lmost 30 years of research and 
experience has demonstrated that the education of children 
with disabilities can be made more effective by” training 
teachers on “the use of scientifically based instructional 
practices, to the maximum extent possible,” and providing 
incentives for “scientifically based early reading programs.”  
Id. § 1400(c)(5)(E) and (F). 
Unfortunately, neither the text of the IDEA nor the 
IDEA regulations provide much guidance as to the effect of 
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)’s peer-reviewed research provision in 
this case.  Therefore, we will look to other instructive 
regulatory materials.  See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 
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(1997) (explaining that when interpreting a statute and its 
implementing regulations, we may look to the agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations); United States v. 
Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(stating that we must defer not only to interpretations 
supported by notice-and-comment rulemaking, but also 
“informal interpretations”); Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 
801, 808 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]f an agency has been granted 
administrative authority by Congress for a statute, its 
interpretation—despite arising in an informal context—will 
be given deference as long as it is consistent with other 
agency pronouncements and furthers the purposes of the 
Act.”).  In conjunction with its promulgation of the 2006 
IDEA regulations, the U.S. Department of Education 
(“DOE”) issued an Analysis of Comments and Changes to the 
2006 IDEA Regulations (“Analysis of IDEA Regulations”), 
71 Fed. Reg. 46,540 (2006).  In response to a comment 
requesting “clear guidance on the responsibilities of States, 
school districts, and school personnel to provide special 
education and related services . . . that are based on peer-
reviewed research,” the DOE stated that “States, school 
districts, and school personnel must . . . select and use 
methods that research has shown to be effective, to the extent 
that methods based on peer-reviewed research are available.”  
71 Fed. Reg. at 46,665.  The agency made clear, however, 
that a student’s IEP team retains flexibility in devising an 
appropriate program.  The Analysis of IDEA Regulations 
explained that the changes implemented by the 2004 IDEA 
amendments and the 2006 updated regulations 
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“do[] not mean that the service with the greatest 
body of research is the service necessarily 
required for a child to receive FAPE.  Likewise, 
there is nothing in the Act to suggest that the 
failure of a public agency to provide services 
based on peer-reviewed research would 
automatically result in a denial of FAPE.  The 
final decision about the special education and 
related services . . . that are to be provided to a 
child must be made by the child’s IEP Team 
based on the child’s individual needs.” 
Id. 
In response to a comment requesting that the DOE 
require programs provided to a disabled child to be research-
based with demonstrated effectiveness in addressing the 
particular needs of a child, the Analysis of IDEA Regulations 
stated, “[w]hile the Act clearly places an emphasis on 
practices that are based on scientific research, there is nothing 
in the Act that requires all programs provided to children with 
disabilities to be research-based with demonstrated 
effectiveness in addressing the particular needs of a child 
where not practicable.”  Id.  The DOE declined to adopt the 
recommended change because “ultimately, it is the child’s 
IEP Team that determines the special education and related 
services that are needed by the child in order for the child to 
receive FAPE.”  Id.  The DOE also rejected as “overly 
burdensome” a requirement that all IEP team meetings 
include a focused discussion of research-based methods and a 
proposed regulation that would force schools to provide 
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written notice when an IEP team does not provide 
documentation of research-based methods.  Id.9
We can discern two key principles from these 
administrative materials and our prior decisions interpreting 
the IDEA.  First, although schools should strive to base a 
student’s specially designed instruction on peer-reviewed 
research to the maximum extent possible, the student’s IEP 
team retains flexibility to devise an appropriate program, in 
light of the available research.  See D.S., 602 F.3d at 557; 71 
Fed. Reg. at 46,665.  Second, under the IDEA, courts must 
accord significant deference to the choices made by school 
officials as to what constitutes an appropriate program for 
each student.  See D.S., 602 F.3d at 556-57; Ridgewood Bd. of 
Educ., 172 F.3d at 247; 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,664-65. 
 
With these principles in mind, we will consider the 
two objections that Parents raise to the portion of E.R.’s IEP 
that addresses her reading and language disabilities.  First, 
echoing the findings of the Hearing Officer, Parents argue 
that “there were flaws in the research [regarding the 
                                              
9 Commenters also requested a more explicit definition 
of “peer-reviewed research.”  The DOE stated that “‘[p]eer 
reviewed research’ generally refers to research that is 
reviewed by qualified and independent reviewers to ensure 
that the quality of the information meets the standards of the 
field before the research is published.”  71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 
46,664 (2006).  However, the agency made clear that there 
was no single definition of “peer-reviewed research” and it 
declined to include a specific definition for purposes of the 
IDEA.  Id. 
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effectiveness of Project Read] which made it impossible to 
attribute the reading growth the students experienced [in the 
studies] to Project Read alone.”  Second, they contend that 
none of the studies regarding Project Read demonstrated that 
the program was effective for students with E.R.’s specific 
disabilities.  Both arguments miss the mark.  Given that the 
IDEA does not require an IEP to provide the “optimal level of 
services,” D.S., 602 F.3d at 557 (citations omitted), we 
likewise hold that the IDEA does not require a school district 
to choose the program supported by the optimal level of peer-
reviewed research.  Rather, the peer-reviewed specially 
designed instruction in an IEP must be “reasonably calculated 
to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits 
in light of the student’s intellectual potential.”  Chambers, 
587 F.3d at 182 (citation omitted). 
According to a 2007 review of Project Read published 
by the Florida Center for Reading Research (“FCRR”): 
“Project Read is a comprehensive language arts 
program designed to provide explicit instruction 
in a structured reading curriculum.  The goal of 
the program is to help all students become 
thoughtful, purposeful, and independent 
readers.  Project Read Curriculum may be 
implemented in the regular classroom, special 
education classes, and Title I classes.  It may 
also be used as an intervention reading program 
for first through sixth graders or with 
adolescents and adults who struggle with 
reading or language learning.  Whole or small 
group instruction is delivered by a classroom 
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teacher, a special education teacher, or a 
reading teacher.  Lessons are intended to occur 
daily within an extended block of time devoted 
to reading instruction.  Emphasis is placed on 
systematic, direct instruction of concepts and 
skills supported and enhanced by a teaching 
approach that includes visual, kinesthetic, 
auditory and tactile strategies (VAKT), and the 
use of body language.” 
After discussing several studies on the effectiveness of 
Project Read, and citing relevant articles, at least one of 
which was published in a peer-reviewed journal, the FCRR 
review concluded that the research “[was] promising and the 
instructional strategies of Project Read [we]re aligned with 
current research.  Future studies with sound experimental 
designs including control groups and random assignment may 
contribute more definitive information about the efficacy of 
Project Read.”  The FCRR review then listed numerous 
strengths of the Project Read program, and found no 
weaknesses in Project Read’s curriculum. 
We understand Parents’ concern that the available 
studies did not test Project Read’s effectiveness for students 
with E.R.’s unique combination of disabilities.  However, the 
research discussed in the FCRR review involved children of 
E.R.’s age who struggled with reading, and indicated that 
Project Read was helpful in improving the reading skills of 
such students.  Additionally, Hodges, Grace Park’s resource 
room teacher, and Woods, Ridley’s director of special 
education, both of whom have expertise in the field of special 
education, testified that Project Read was an appropriate 
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reading program for E.R.10
Parents argue that, in contrast to Project Read, the 
program they requested, The Wilson Reading System, has 
been shown to be effective for teaching students with learning 
disabilities similar to those of E.R.  However, Ridley did not 
have to choose the specific program requested by Parents.  
See D.S., 602 F.3d at 557.  Nor did it have to choose the 
program supported by the optimal level of peer-reviewed 
research.  See id.; 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,665 (explaining that a 
school does not have to choose the program supported by the 
“greatest body of research”).  “The IDEA accords educators 
discretion to select from various methods for meeting the 
individualized needs of a student, provided those practices are 
reasonably calculated to provide h[er] with educational 
benefit.”  R.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 
  Woods explained that, “Project 
Read is a multi-sensory program that is based on Orton 
Gillingham’s principles that support learning disabled 
students.  The research from Florida was very promising in 
terms of these students doing quite well.”  Woods further 
testified that “[t]he program . . . had a lot of components that 
learning disabled students learn by [including] what we called 
VAKT program, visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and touch.  And 
most learning disabled students do very well when you bring 
all of the senses into the learning process.”  Hodges also 
testified that Project Read was a research-based program and 
similar to other reading programs, such as The Wilson 
Reading System. 
                                              
10 The Hearing Officer did not discuss the assessments 
of Project Read provided by Hodges and Woods. 
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1122 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Rowley, 458 U.S. 
at 207 (explaining that school districts have “[t]he primary 
responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a 
handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method 
most suitable to the child’s needs”).  In selecting special 
education programs, a school district must be able to take into 
account not only the needs of the disabled student, but also 
the financial and administrative resources that different 
programs will require, and the needs of the school’s other 
non-disabled students.  See J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 
60, 70 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that, in the context of the 
Rehabilitation Act, courts must be aware of the “need to 
strike a balance” between the rights of the disabled student 
and fiscal and administrative concerns); 71 Fed. Reg. at 
46,665 (rejecting a proposed requirement on an IEP team as 
“overly burdensome”). 
We will not set forth any bright-line rule as to what 
constitutes an adequately peer-reviewed special education 
program; hearing officers and reviewing courts must continue 
to assess the appropriateness of an IEP on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account the available research.  We 
recognize that there may be cases in which the specially 
designed instruction proposed by a school district is so at 
odds with current research that it constitutes a denial of a 
FAPE.  See, e.g., Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. D.L., No. 07-
00278, 51 IDELR 15 (LRP) (S.D. Iowa Aug. 7, 2008) 
(explaining that a student was denied a FAPE, in part, 
because the school district frequently employed strategies 
which contradicted the relevant research and were even 
inconsistent with the school’s own assessment of the 
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appropriate program for the student).11
                                              
11 The IDEA’s peer-reviewed research requirement is 
not set forth in isolation; it is part of a broader section 
discussing the content of the IEP, which requires “a statement 
of the special education and related services . . . that will be 
provided for the child” to meet certain specified objectives, 
namely  “to advance appropriately toward attaining the 
annual goals[,]” “to be involved in and make progress in the 
general education curriculum . . . and to participate in 
extracurricular and other nonacademic activities[,]” and “to 
be educated and participate with other children with 
disabilities and nondisabled children in” educational 
activities.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). 
  Additionally, if it is 
practicable for a school district to implement a program based 
upon peer-reviewed research, and the school fails to do so, 
that will weigh heavily against a finding that the school 
provided a FAPE.  However, that is not the case here.  Ridley 
relied on available peer-reviewed research in crafting the IEP 
for E.R., and proposed a program with specially designed 
instruction that was “reasonably calculated” to enable her to 
achieve meaningful educational benefits in light of her 
intellectual potential and individual abilities.  See Rowley, 
458 U.S. at 207.  Thus, we conclude that the District Court 
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properly reversed the Hearing Officer’s finding that the IEP 
was inadequate to provide a FAPE.12
                                              
12 The Hearing Officer also awarded Parents 
compensatory education for the end of the 2007-2008 school 
year, despite the fact that Project Read was not yet 
implemented, and Ridley was continuing to use its existing 
“resource room” reading program.  The Hearing Officer did 
not explain this conclusion, and based on the record, we 
cannot agree.  Pursuant to E.R.’s IEP and the May NOREP, 
both of which Parents agreed to, for the last eighteen days of 
first grade, E.R. received one hour of reading instruction in 
the resource room.  The resource room reading curriculum 
consisted of Reading Naturally, Reading Workshop, Writing 
Workshop, and Patricia Cunningham’s Systematic Phonics.  
Hodges testified that although the same programs were used 
for all students in the resource room, she tailored the 
programs to each student’s individual needs.  Moreover, 
E.R.’s evaluations all indicated that she would benefit from 
multi-sensory learning, and Hodges explained that all 
activities done in the resource room were multi-sensory.  She 
also explained that “all of the research points to a balanced 
literacy program which is hammering away at phonemic 
awareness, phonics, comprehension, fluency, and vocabulary.  
And with the repertoire that we were using throughout the 
week, I think we hit all those schools.”  We can find no 
evidence in the record that rebuts this testimony.  In light of 
the fact that reviewing courts must be mindful not to 
substitute their views of what constitute preferable 
educational methods for those of school officials, who have 
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D. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
 Parents next contend that the District Court erred in 
reversing the Hearing Officer’s determination that Ridley 
violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act during E.R.’s first 
grade year.  We disagree.  The Rehabilitation Act provides 
that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . 
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded 
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination” under any program that receives 
federal funds.  29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  This prohibition was 
extended to public school systems through § 504.  Id. 
§ 794(b)(2)(B).  To establish a violation of § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, Parents were required to prove that 
(1) E.R. was disabled; (2) she was “otherwise qualified” to 
participate in school activities; (3) Ridley received federal 
financial assistance; and (4) E.R. was excluded from 
participation in, denied the benefits of, or subject to 
                                                                                                     
expertise in the area, D.S., 602 F.3d at 564, we agree with the 
District Court that the Hearing Officer erred in determining 
that Ridley denied E.R. a FAPE during the end of first grade. 
 
Because we hold that the resource room instruction 
provided during the end of the 2007-2008 school year was 
sufficient to provide a FAPE, we likewise hold that the 
Hearing Officer erred in finding that the IEP was inadequate 
for September 2008 (the first month of second grade).  The 
same programs that were used during the end of first grade 
were scheduled to be used in September, until Project Read 
was ready to be implemented. 
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discrimination at Ridley.  Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d 
at 253.  Here, the parties dispute only the fourth element. 
 As we have explained, § 504’s “negative prohibition” 
is similar to the IDEA’s “affirmative duty” and also requires 
schools that receive federal financial assistance to “provide a 
free appropriate public education to each qualified 
handicapped person who is in the recipient’s jurisdiction.”  
Matula, 67 F.3d at 492-93 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)).  
To offer an “appropriate” education under the Rehabilitation 
Act, a school district must reasonably accommodate the needs 
of the handicapped child so as to ensure meaningful 
participation in educational activities and meaningful access 
to educational benefits.  See J.D., 224 F.3d at 70 (citing 
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 n.20 (1985)); D.S., 
602 F.3d at 556 (explaining that under the IDEA, a state must 
supply an education that provides “significant learning” and 
“meaningful benefit”) (citation omitted); Ridgewood Bd. of 
Educ., 172 F.3d at 253.13
                                              
13 The regulations implementing § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act state:  “the provision of an appropriate 
education is the provision of regular or special education and 
related aids and services that (i) are designed to meet 
individual educational needs of handicapped persons as 
adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met. 
. . .”  34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1). 
  However, § 504 does not mandate 
“substantial” changes to the school’s programs, Se. Cmty. 
Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979), and courts “should 
be mindful of the need to strike a balance between the rights 
of the student and h[er] parents and the legitimate financial 
 
42 
and administrative concerns of the [s]chool [d]istrict,” J.D., 
224 F.3d at 70-71 (internal marks and citation omitted).  But 
“[t]he fact that it is more convenient, either administratively 
or fiscally, to provide services in a segregated manner, does 
not constitute a valid justification for separate or different 
services.”  Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 485, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 473). 
 In June 2006, prior to E.R.’s kindergarten year, Ridley 
prepared an Allergy Treatment Plan, which alerted school 
staff to E.R.’s allergies and the signs of an allergic reaction, 
and explained how school officials should react if E.R. were 
to have an allergic reaction.  In February 2007, a § 504 
Service Agreement was implemented to further address 
E.R.’s health issues.  The Service Agreement reflected 
Parents’ request that E.R. be included in as many activities as 
possible, and provided that because E.R. was “only to eat 
foods provided by parents,” Parents were to be contacted 
before activities involving shared food so that appropriate 
alternatives could be provided.  The Service Agreement also 
required all students in the classroom to wash their hands 
before and after meals, required E.R. to wash her hands after 
touching physical education or OT equipment, mandated that 
E.R. wear gloves provided by Parents when handling glue, 
and provided that E.R. would only use supplies and utensils 
provided by Parents. 
Parents allege that Cenname “stubbornly and 
persistently” refused to implement the Service Agreement, 
which led to E.R. being “singled out, isolated and denied full 
participation with her classroom peers.”  The Hearing Officer 
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cited the following incidents as evidence of Ridley’s 
discrimination against E.R.  First, as part of a “Clifford the 
Dog” celebration, E.R.’s classmates were given brownies 
with red icing and red juice, but because E.R.’s allergies 
prevented her from eating that food, she was given a cupcake 
from the nurse’s freezer that had been provided by her 
mother.  Second, a program on nutrition was offered, along 
with a specific snack.  Although Parents were notified of the 
program in advance, they were not told what the snack would 
be, and therefore, E.R. ended up having to eat a snack from 
home.  Third, according to E.R.’s mother, Cenname cancelled 
an Earth Day project rather than design an alternative snack 
for E.R.  E.R.’s mother testified that Cenname commented 
that she did not understand why the other students in class 
should have to accommodate one child when E.R.’s parents 
could provide separate food.  Fourth, due to her allergies, 
E.R. was required to wear loose cotton clothes.  E.R.’s mother 
testified that she often had difficulty locating reasonably 
priced clothing that complied with Ridley’s dress code:  green 
shirts, khaki pants, and a white sweater.  Despite this 
difficulty, on two occasions, Cenname remarked to E.R. that 
her clothes were not in compliance with the dress code, which 
according to Parents, caused E.R. to “feel[] humiliated.”  
Fifth, students in E.R.’s first grade class participated in an 
activity in which they worked with partners to sift sand, 
pebbles, and gravel, and compare the various shapes and 
sizes.  Due to her severe allergies, E.R. was not permitted to 
touch dirt without using gloves.  Cenname testified that she 
had forgotten about the sand activity when preparing her 
update to E.R.’s mother, and thus, was unsure whether E.R. 
could touch any of the materials.  “To be safe,” Cenname 
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instructed E.R. to let her partner handle the materials, but 
E.R. was allowed to participate in the project in every other 
way.  Finally, E.R. was given several poor grades on 
penmanship tests.  Parents blame this on Cenname’s failure to 
notice that E.R.’s chair did not allow her to brace herself for 
writing tasks. 
 We agree with the District Court that although each of 
these incidents “may illustrate how E.R.’s daily school 
routine necessarily had to be different than her classmates,” 
they do not constitute § 504 violations.  Ridley, 2011 WL 
499966, at *17.  There is no evidence in the record that E.R. 
was excluded from participation in educational activities, 
denied educational benefits, or otherwise subjected to 
discrimination.  See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 253.  
E.R. was not denied meaningful participation in the food-
related activities; she simply had to eat something slightly 
different than the food eaten by her classmates.  Parents argue 
that Cenname could have complied with the Rehabilitation 
Act by allowing E.R.’s mother to prepare snacks for the entire 
class that were suitable to E.R.’s dietary needs.  The statute 
simply does not require that.  See Davis, 442 U.S. at 410 
(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act distinguishes “between 
the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons 
and affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by 
handicaps”).  Similarly, E.R. was not denied the educational 
benefit of the sand, pebbles, and gravel lesson, even though 
she was not allowed to touch the materials.  Contrary to 
Parents’ suggestions, this case does not involve a situation in 
which a school district attempted to provide separate-but-
equal services to a disabled student.  See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 
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338.  Ridley took reasonable steps to accommodate E.R.’s 
disabilities and include her in all class activities; it was not 
required to grant the specific accommodations requested by 
Parents or otherwise make substantial modifications to the 
programs that were used for all other students.  J.D., 224 F.3d 
at 70.  Additionally, although Cenname may have exercised 
poor judgment in commenting on E.R.’s clothes, in the 
absence of evidence that E.R. was excluded from 
participation in educational activities or denied educational 
benefits, two isolated comments do not rise to the level of a § 
504 violation.  See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 253.  
Nor does Cenname’s alleged failure to identify the position of 
E.R.’s chair as the source of her struggles on penmanship 
tests. 
 E. Other Claims 
Finally, Parents argue that the District Court erred in 
dismissing their claim for damages under the Rehabilitation 
Act, their claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and a state law claim 
against Cenname for “outrageous conduct causing severe 
emotional distress.”  Parents contend that these claims were 
not the subject of Ridley’s motion for judgment on the 
administrative record, and thus were not before the District 
Court.  Accordingly, Parents ask us to remand to the District 
Court to consider their remaining claims.  We decline to do 
so; although the District Court did not address the claims, we 
can affirm based on any grounds supported by the record.  
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Chambers, 587 F.3d at 183-84.14
IV.  Conclusion 
  First, because Parents’ 
Rehabilitation Act claim fails, they are not entitled to 
damages.  Second, the substantive standards for determining 
liability under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are the 
same, McDonald v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 
94-95 (3d Cir. 1995), and thus the District Court did not err in 
disposing of Parents’ claim under the ADA.  Finally, because 
no federal claims remained, dismissal of Parents’ state law 
claim was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
                                              
14 Although the principle that an appellate court may 
affirm on any grounds supported by the record has previously 
been articulated in the summary judgment context, it is based 
on considerations of judicial efficiency, and we see no reason 
not to apply the same principle to a district court’s grant of 
judgment on the administrative record. 
